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Abstract: To create sustainable, adaptive and resilient societies we need to develop a 
proper understanding of infrastructure risk. This research improves such 
understanding by examining widespread failures of interdependent infrastructure 
networks from extreme climate events. By subjecting infrastructure networks to 
extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct failure sets that lead to 
cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure networks. Such analysis 
produces two results: (1) Estimations of the topological fragility of infrastructure 
networks, and (2) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial affects 
on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing 
multiple failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build 
infrastructure failure profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our 
understanding of infrastructure failures and are used to inform resilience-building 
activities for effective infrastructure provision. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure sustainability, adaptation or resilience is better understood by examining 
national infrastructure risk. In the context of this research, national infrastructures represent civil 
and technological structures that provide goods and services to industries, governments and 
households operating at regional and national scales. In particular infrastructures such as 
electricity, gas, rail, road, and ICT are among critical national infrastructures, constituting the 
backbone of society and economy
1,2
. For better performance and service provision national 
infrastructures are highly interdependent systems through physical, technological or economic 
mechanisms
3
.Though interdependencies are desirable for maintaining infrastructure functionality 
and service delivery, they become disadvantageous during widespread failures, which result in 
failure cascading effects that propagate damages from one infrastructure to another
4
.  
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Extreme climate events put national infrastructures at risk because they are capable of causing 
widespread social and economic losses. Notably extreme hurricanes in the United States, floods 
in United Kingdom, and extreme heat in Australia have highlighted the large-scale 
vulnerabilities of national infrastructures provisions
5,6,7
. National scale climate change risk 
assessment policy statements have emphasized the imminent risks to critical national 
infrastructures in the present and future
8,9
. Climate risk modeling is inherently complex due to 
systematic uncertainties that propagate from extreme climate hazards towards infrastructure 
responses and failure impacts
10
. For critical national infrastructures a system-of-systems (SoS) 
approach is required for modeling escalating failures that affect multiple systems and multiple 
participants
11
. In this paper we present a SoS framework where infrastructures represent systems 
of interdependent spatial networks that are exposed to probabilistic extreme hazard scenarios.   
 
Infrastructures are spatially distributed systems spread over large geographic areas. Further 
there are several components or assets within each infrastructure and across infrastructures that 
are connected physically or through flow of information. As such an overall spatial network 
topology can be identified to build a unified representation of infrastructures
12
. Extreme climate 
loading conditions initiate random failures of network assets and the topology determines the 
further propagation of these failures across entire networks
13
. Following network damages the 
SoS risks are quantified in terms of the consequences in terms of spatial damage impacts, 
demographic disruption impacts and interdependent economic loss impacts
14
.   
 
The climate risk analysis methodology proposed in this paper aims to compute the overall risk 
of failure of infrastructure networks when exposed to multiple probabilistic climate hazards. By 
subjecting infrastructure networks to extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct 
asset failure sets that lead to cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure 
networks. Such analysis produces two results: (i) Estimations of the topological fragility of 
infrastructure networks, and (ii) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial 
affects on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing multiple 
failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build infrastructure failure 
profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our understanding of infrastructure failures and 
are used to inform resilience-building activities for effective infrastructure provisions. 
 
In the sections that follow we first explain the formulation for calculating interdependent 
infrastructure risk for extreme climate hazards. Next we present the underlying SoS framework 
that needs to be constructed for implementing the different components of the risk calculations. 
This is followed by a sample case-study demonstration for a national-scale network and hazard. 
 
II. Quantifying infrastructure risk 
 
Infrastructure risk is broadly quantified as the product of the probabilities and consequences 
of network failures conditional upon probabilistic extreme climate hazards 
10
. Within the context 
of this paper, reliability is the measure of the probability of failure, which is studied at the 
individual assets level and then at the infrastructure network level. For damage assessment the 
focus lies in estimating the customer losses and infrastructure output degradations, which 
ultimately are converted to economic losses a
scale levels.  
 
Probabilistic extreme climate loading is quantified in terms of its spatial magnitude vector 
and joint probability distribution
infrastructure asset functionality through a state function
state and  denotes a ‘non-failed’ state. Also we define two variables: (i) 
conditional probability of failure of an ass
loading , (ii) : The damage associated with the failure of the asset. For the entire 
infrastructure network, consisting of 
states collected into a binary vector
describing which assets have failed and which have not failed. In particular network reliability, 
damages and risk depend upon the elements in 
 
When exposed to the hazard there are many possible failure combinations of assets that result 
in network failure. In the most exhaustive scenario there are possible 
combinations, but in reality fewer combinations can capture most of the failures. The vector
defined before represents just one of the possible
mechanism. We define the vector
the tensor
overall network failure. The infrastructure network risk (
paper is based on: (i) estimating the combined asset failure probabilities (
( ) due to multiple failure mechanisms, and (ii) repeating the calculations over multiple 
hazard loadings . This is shown in Equation (1) below and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework for risk calculations required in the network failure analysis
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t appropriate individual asset, network or national
 . To calculate risk we first represent an 
, such that  denotes a ‘failed’ 
et (fragility) when subjected to the external hazard 
 assets, functionality depends on all the asset 
, whose elements are either 0 or 1 
.  
failure states and is defined here as a 
 to represent the  failure mechanism and 
 as the collection of failure combinations that contribute to 
) formulation proposed in this 
summarized in Figure 1.
  
 
 
-
 
individual 
: The 
 failure state 
 
failure 
) and damages 
 
(1) 
. 
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III. Risk implementation 
 
Figure 2 shows a detailed flowchart for constructing component models and implementing a 
national infrastructure risk calculation framework that solves Equation (1).  The important 
components in the flowchart are explained as follows: 
 
1. Hazard estimation (Component A): Different types of extreme climate models can be built 
to estimate hazard severity () and uncertainty (). Some of the models (Hazard extent 
maps/Spatial distributions of hazards/Spatial-temporal distributions of hazards) that are used 
in this framework are shown in the component A. 
 
2. Network estimation (Component B): Topological network representations are essential for 
generating failures and computing failure probabilities (

|). In this framework 
networks are built from information on the geo-locations of assets and their physical 
connectivity to other assets and networks.  
 
3. Network reliability analysis (Component C): Reliability analysis provides the framework 
for building failure mechanisms, which leads to the computation of asset and topological 
fragilities, and ultimately the network failure probability. In this framework direct failures 
simulated by Monte-Carlo based approaches and network connectivity are utilised to 
estimate resulting topological failures.  
 
4. Infrastructure damage assessment (Component D): Damages are quantified spatially by 
first constructing infrastructure footprints that estimate the number of customers served over 
the area influence of assets. Following this the direct and indirect spatial and demographic 
impact effects for asset damages and network losses can be quantified by assembling the 
footprints of all failed assets. For economic analysis purposes, the total network damage 
effects constitute direct economic losses due to infrastructure asset failures. 
 
5. Economic damage (loss) assessment (Component E): The supply and demand side loss 
inputs are fed into an economic input-output model. Using the economic input-output 
analysis to find the disrupted equilibrium state we can generate the indirect losses and total 
losses (	


) due to the network failures. 
 
6. Risk calculation (Component F): Network risk 
 is computed when the reliability and 
damage estimations are implemented over multiple failure mechanisms and multiple hazards.    
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Figure 2: Flowchart showing steps in the ITRC WS2 Phase 2 infrastructure risk analysis. 
IV. Case-study demonstration 
 
Obtaining high quality data for the different components of the risk framework is very 
challenging, so models are employed wherever necessary. The case-study results shown here are 
synthetic but serve the important purpose of providing a template for risk calculations when real 
data is available. The risk methodology outlined in the sections above is implemented for 
simulated probabilistic hazard events that affect a sample topological electricity network for 
Great Britain. The network is a satisfactory topological representation of the actual electricity 
transmission network for Great Britain
15
. Further, the network nodes represent electricity 
substations that served customers over regions estimated from population census data
16
. 
 
Figure 3(a) introduces the test network with nodes (substation) fragilities, magnified according 
to their relative values, after being intersected with a sample probabilistic spatial hazard event. 
This result is obtained by implementing the components A, B and C from the framework Figure 
2. Using Figure 3(a) we can identify the substations that are at most risk of failing. Based on the 
node fragilities and resulting network behaviors we can generate a sample of different possible 
failure mechanisms. This is shown in Figure 3(b) where the resulting damages in terms of 
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customers affected are calculated for each direct and indirect failure mechanism. Hence, we are 
also able to obtain a range of possible risk outcomes from the analysis.     
 
Figure 3. Figures showing (a) The network node fragilities (color coded and weighted by 
magnitude) for a particular hazard event, (b) Sample failure mechanisms and direct and indirect 
customers affected. 
      
Another outcome of the analysis is shown in Figure 4 where the ranges of risks (in £ millions) 
are calculated for multiple mechanisms across different hazard events (given by their exceedance 
probabilities). This result is obtained by executing the components D and F in the Figure 2 
framework. Figure 4 captures the uncertainty of the risk analysis across a range of different 
infrastructure provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Plot of risks in £ million vs. hazard exceedance probabilities. The solid line shows the 
mean risk and the shaded boundaries show the maximum and minimum risk outcomes. 
(b) (a) 
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